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BREAKING AWAY FROM THE "PRAYER
POLICE": WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
PERMITS SECTARIAN LEGISLATIVE PRAYER
AND DEMANDS A "PRACTICE FOCUSED"
ANALYSIS
Robert Luther III* & David B. Caddell"
Historically, the "ineluctable tension"1 within the First
Amendment has concerned the relationship between the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause when the
cause of such tension was an issue that involved a question of
religion and its role in the public square.2 However, in a post-
* Fellow, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California (2007); Summer
Associate, The Rutherford Institute (2006). J.D., Ohio Northern University
Pettit College of Law (2006), B.A., Hampden-Sydney College, magna cum laude
(2003). Rob would like to thank John W. Whitehead for providing him the
opportunity to research this issue during the summer of 2006. He would also
like to thank his co-author Dave Caddell as well as the entire staff of the Santa
Clara Law Review for all of their assistance. The views expressed in this article
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Pacific Legal Foundation. Rob can be
reached at RobLuther@gmail.com.
** Staff Attorney, The Rutherford Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia (2005 -
Present), J.D., Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University
(2005), B.S., Northern Kentucky University (2002). Dave can be reached at
DBCaddell@yahoo.com.
1. See Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Reconciling the Conflict," 41 U. Pirr L. REV. 673, 673 (1980) ("In this chapter I
wish to confront the ineluctable tension that exists between the two provisions-a
conflict that the Court has conceded . . . ."). Such "ineluctable tension" between
the religion clauses was not intended by the Framers. John Baker,
Amendments: Establishment of Religion, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE
CONSTITUTION 302 (Edwin Meese III, Matthew Spalding & David F. Forte eds.,
2005) ("In recent years the Supreme Court has placed the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause of Religion clauses in mutual tension, but it was
not so for the Framers.").
2. See generally James J. Knicely, "First Principles" and the Misplacement
of the "Wall of Separation": Too Late in the Day for a Cure?, 52 DRAKE L. REV.
171 (2004). Needless to say, if the Establishment Clause were not incorporated
against the states, it is unlikely that any of the cases discussed in this paper
569
570 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:48
Employment Division v. Smith3 world, it is not uncommon to
find advocates who raise Establishment Clause claims
confronted with the defense of the Free Speech Clause.
4
Thus, "religious speech in the public square" cases that range
from high school valedictorians who wish to speak about the
role of a particular religion in their life at graduation, 5 to
cases where legislators, city council persons, school board
6members, or invited clergy7  wish to open legislative
gatherings in the name of the deity most personal to them are
often met with intense condemnation and scrutiny.'
would entail "Establishment Clause concerns."
3. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (holding that
neutral laws of general applicability may be upheld despite an incidental
burden on the practice of one's religion).
4. In cases involving religious speech in the public square, advocates are
left with little choice but to raise Free Speech arguments in view of the fact that
federal courts have closed the door to traditional Free Exercise claims in the
years that have followed Smith. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 n.1 (2006) ("As originally enacted, RFRA
applied to States as well as the Federal Government. In City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), we held the application to States to be beyond
Congress' legislative authority under § 5 of the 14th Amendment.").
5. Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch., 228 F.3d 1092, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000);
Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that a student selected on objective criteria to present a valedictory
address may not disclaim sectarian, proselytizing religious speech at a
graduation ceremony).
6. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006); Turner
v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56786 (E.D. Va. Aug.
14, 2006); Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005), stay
denied, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007).
7. Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 410 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (denying
plaintiffs/taxpayers motion for preliminary injunction to forbid invited clergy for
invoking sectarian references during course of legislative prayer);
Klingenschmitt v. Winter, No. 06-01832 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2006), dismissed, 2007
U.S. App. LEXIS 22630 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 21, 2007). Compare Jim Sparks,




ov!&s=1037645509123 (County in Winston-Salem, North Carolina refuses to
adopt nonsectarian prayer policy), with Tom Steadman, Prayer Debate Heats
Up, NEWS-RECORD, Jul. 17, 2007, http'//www.news-
record.com/apps/pbcs.dllarticle?AID=/20070717/NEWSRECOl00170716026/-
1/NEWSRECO201 (High Point, North Carolina citizens protest Point City
Council's 9-1 decision to permit only nonsectarian references in legislative
prayers).
8. For treatment of the controversy surrounding military chaplains who
seek to close prayer with sectarian references, see Klingenschmitt v. Winter,
No. 06-01832 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2006), dismissed, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22630
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There had been virtually no litigation or legal authority
concerning the constitutionality of sectarian legislative
prayer until the last six years. As a general observation, the
first federal courts to confront the issue tended to over-read9
the U.S. Supreme Court's seminal opinion on legislative
prayer, Marsh v. Chambers,10 by restricting all sectarian
content from prayers, although some courts have recently cut
back on this initial over-reading. 1 While it is clear that "if
Marsh means anything, it is that the Establishment Clause
does not scrutinize legislative invocations with the same rigor
that it appraises other religious activities,"12 it is equally
evident that lower federal courts have failed to adopt a
consistent framework for answering the question of whether
the Constitution permits political bodies to control the
content of a speaker's religious speech during legislative
prayer.
In anticipation of the Supreme Court's final word, and
with the hope of providing clarity to this dialogue in the
meantime, we will discuss the reasons why Marsh permits
the use of sectarian references despite the confusion within
lower federal courts generated by reliance on dicta contained
in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union13-a
case that dealt with religious symbols and not religious
speech. This article urges courts to favor the historical and
constitutional policy of permitting individuals to choose their
own words when engaging in speech, including religious
speech, within the public square. Legislative bodies that
refuse to allow those who are permitted to pray the right to
mention specific deities of their choosing -- Jesus, Allah,
Jehovah, or others - in their prayers undermines diversity
and the free speech rights of these individuals, and, in turn,
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 21, 2007). See generally Jeremy G. Mallory, Comment, "An
Officer of the House Which Chooses Him, and Nothing More": How Should
Marsh v. Chambers Apply to Rotating Chaplains?," 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421
(2006).
9. See Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004);
Simpson v. Chesterfield County, 404 F.3d 276, 287 (4th Cir. 2005); Bosma, 440
F.3d 393; Turner, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5676.
10. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
11. Pelphrey,410 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (2006); Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch.
Bd., 473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006) (Clement, J., dissenting).
12. Simpson v. Chesterfield County, 404 F.3d 276, 287 (4th Cir. 2005).
13. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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renders these traditionally solemn occasions meaningless.
As a result of these seemingly ambiguous and disparate
road signs, conflict exists amongst the federal circuits in
these legislative prayer cases.14 An attempt at reconciliation
has created a myriad of confusing paths before courts
addressing the issue." United States District Court Judge
David Hamilton articulated a number of. these diverging
philosophies when he stated:
There are three solutions to the problem the Speaker has
raised in terms of the inherently sectarian content of any
prayer. The first would be to find that all religious prayer
in this context (official speech as part of the formal
legislative proceedings) violates the Establishment
Clause. That was the approach of Justices Brennan and
Marshall in dissent in Marsh. The second is to find that
the problem is not really a problem, so that legislative
prayers based on inclusion and common traditions are
permissible under the Establishment Clause. That was
the approach of the Court majority in Marsh .... The
third would be to find that courts should not try to
distinguish between permissible and impermissible prayer
in this context, and so should permit any legislative
prayer, no matter how sectarian, divisive, exclusive, or
even hostile to other faiths it might be.
16
There is also a fourth approach Judge Hamilton fails to
mention and which is discussed in detail in this article.
Instead of following some grand, new judicially promulgated
design, it makes more sense to adhere to the words of the
Supreme Court precedent in Marsh by refusing to "parse"1 7
particular prayers to the extent that a prayer does not
"proselytize or disparage the particular tenets or beliefs of
individual faiths."'" This approach is not only faithful to
14. Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005), stay denied,
440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25363 (7th Cir. Oct.
30, 2007); Doe, 473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006); Wynne, 376 F.3d 292; Pelphrey, 410
F. Supp. 2d 1324; Turner, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56786.
15. See Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1128.
16. Id.
17. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983).
18. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1234 (10th Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (refusing to permit prayer that proselytizes or disparages the tenets or
beliefs of individual faiths because "[a] principal effect of [such] prayer, as
practiced by Snyder and others, will be the symbolic association of government
power with religious-and antireligious-intolerance and bigotry").
572 [Vo1:48
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precedent, it strikes the appropriate balance between
permissible legislative prayer under Marsh and the
hyperbolic fear of those who contend that unchecked
legislative prayers could cause city council meetings to turn
into spiritual revival sessions. Courts must recognize that
"non-sectarian only prayer policies fail to allow individuals to
pray according to their consciences and serve only to 'tame,
cheapen, and secularize' what little religion remains in
American public life today."19
I. UNDER MARSH, SECTARIAN REFERENCES INVOKED
DURING LEGISLATIVE PRAYERS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
While there is little doubt that "[t]he opening of sessions
of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer
is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this
country,"2" the Supreme Court's "curious[ly] ambigu[ous]"21
decision in Marsh set the stage for the contemporary
questions surrounding the constitutionality of sectarian
references invoked during legislative prayer.22 In Marsh,
Ernie Chambers, a maverick member of the Nebraska state
legislature23 , brought a civil rights action against Marsh, the
Nebraska state Treasurer, seeking an injunction to halt the
employment of Robert E. Palmer as legislative chaplain,24 on
the theory that both the practice of legislative prayer and the
19. Robert J. Delahunty, "Varied Carols": Legislative Prayer in a Pluralist
Polity, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 517, 521 n.11 (2007) (quoting Michael W.
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 127
(1992)).
20. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.
21. Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393, 403 (7th Cir. 2006) (Kanne, J.,
dissenting).
22. See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 504 F. Supp. 585 (D. Neb. 1980),
rev'd, in part, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
23. Chambers, who has been "characterized by some outlets of the national
media as 'the Maverick of Omaha,' the 'angriest black man in Nebraska,' and
'defender of the downtrodden' filed a lawsuit against God in 2007 seeking a
"permanent injunction ordering Defendant to cease certain harmful activities
and the making of terroristic threats." See Wikipedia, Ernie Chambers,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernie-Chambers#_note-motherjones (last visited
Mar. 12, 2008); Nebraska State Senator Sues God Over Natural Disasters,
FOXNEWS.COM, Sept. 17, 2007,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,297121,00.html
24. At the time the litigation commenced, Robert E. Palmer, a Presbyterian
minister, had served as chaplain for the Nebraska Legislature for sixteen years
(since 1965). Marsh, 463 U.S. at 785.
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state funding of a chaplain to provide legislative prayer
established religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause.25 The District Court concluded that the practice was
constitutional, but, the state was forbidden to fund the
chaplain.26 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
District Court's findings and concluded the practice of
legislative prayer was unconstitutional because it failed all
three prongs of the Lemon test.2 Nevertheless, the state was
permitted to fund the chaplain under the power granted to
the state via the Tenth Amendment.2 8  On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed the district and appellate court
decisions, holding that both the practice and its funding were
constitutional.2 9  The Supreme Court's opinion in Marsh
avoided much discussion about the constitutionality of
legislative prayer and focused, instead, on the historical facts
surrounding the Founders' decision to sanction to such
prayer.30 The Court noted that within days after a final
agreement was reached on the language of the Bill of Rights,
the First Congress adopted a policy whereby a chaplain paid
from Congressional funds would open each session with
prayer.31 In view of these facts, the Court observed, "[cilearly
the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses
did not view . . . opening prayers as a violation of that
Amendment ... "32
The measured opinion of Marsh attempted to balance two
competing interests. First, the Court recognized the need for
an outlet to display "tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs
25. Marsh, 504 F. Supp. at 586.
26. Id. at 592.
27. Marsh, 675 F.2d at 233-35. The government's action must have a
"legitimate secular purpose"; the government's action must not have "the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion"; and the government's action
must not result in any "excessive entanglement" with religion. Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
28. Marsh v. Chambers, 675 F.2d 228, 232-33 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S.
783 (1983). "We recognize that a paid chaplain might be assigned functions
other than offering official prayers, functions that could be deemed proper in
some contexts." Id. at 235.
29. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-95.
30. See id. at 786-92. The Court's opinion in Marsh also marked the first
time the Court failed to apply (or avoided applying) the "Lemon test" since its
decision in that case twelve years earlier. Id.
31. Id. at 787-88.
32. Id. at 788.
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widely held among the people of this country."33 Historically,
deliberative bodies had accomplished this task by "invoke [ing]
Divine guidance" prior to the commencement of their
deliberative session. 4 Yet, the Court also recognized that the
government can not endorse or entangle itself with religion. 5
The Court avoided a decision based on the content of the
prayer. 6 Instead, the Court acknowledged that it is not the
role of the judiciary to "embark on a sensitive evaluation" of
the content of an individual's prayer. Indeed, except for
recognition of Chaplain's Palmer's affiliation with the
Presbyterian Church, the only reference in the Marsh
majority opinion to any sectarian/non-sectarian distinction
came in a footnote, when the Court observed that Palmer
described them as being "'nonsectarian,' 'Judeo Christian,'
and with 'elements of the American civil religion."'3 The
Court declared, however, that legislative prayer falls outside
of this tolerable acknowledgment of religion when "the prayer
opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any
one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief."39 Regardless of
its language, or absence thereof, concerning sectarian
references, Marsh's mandate to lower courts that they not
embark on a sensitive evaluation of the prayer at issue unless
the prayer opportunity is used to proselytize or disparage
another faith cannot reasonably be disputed. °
Just six years later, in Allegheny,41 the Supreme Court
was confronted by a nativity scene located inside the county
courthouse and a menorah located outside of the city-county
building violated the Establishment Clause.4 2  Although
Allegheny involved religious symbols, rather than spoken
words, the plurality opinion launched into a retrospective
discussion of Marsh.3 In dicta, the plurality declared, "not
33. Id. at 792 (emphasis omitted).
34. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
35. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
36. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188, 212 (2006) (Clement,
J., dissenting).
37. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795.
38. Id. at 793 n.14.
39. Id. at 794-95.
40. Id. at 792.
41. Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
42. Id. at 578.
43. Id. at 602-05.
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even the 'unique history' of legislative prayer can justify
contemporary legislative prayers that have the effect of
affiliating the government with any one specific faith or
belief. 4
4
Ironically, by what was apparently an attempt to remain
neutral, the effect was to strong-arm the state into endorsing
a generic, deistic, "god," forcing speakers to adopt a judicially-
generated theological premise that contradicts the Court's
neutrality principle. Additionally the Allegheny plurality
failed to recognize the otherwise seemingly obvious fact that
the Marsh Court "rejected the claim that an Establishment
Clause violation was presented because the prayers had once
been offered in the Judeo-Christian tradition. 45
Retrospective analysis also diminishes the Allegheny
plurality's statement. As the late Chief Justice Rehnquist
recounted twenty-two years later, "In Marsh, the prayers
were often explicitly Christian . *..."" Thus, in view of the
confusion generated by these two seemingly conflicting
opinions, it comes as little surprise that federal courts have
failed to consistently apply Marsh.
II. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE FAILED TO CONSISTENTLY APPLY
MARSH
The unfortunate reality for those who viewed the
Supreme Court's treatment of religion in public life prior to
1980 as particularly harsh47 is that the Court's next twenty-
years revealed only a marginally mixed improvement.48 Yet,
44. Id. at 603.
45. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 688 n.8 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
plurality) (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-94 n.14) (concluding that the
Establishment Clause does not bar a state government from preferring religion
over non-religion).
46. Id.
47. A sampling of pre-Marsh "religion in the public square" cases generated
significant public debate. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (summarily
invalidated a state law that required public schools to post the Ten
Commandments in their classrooms); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (struck down policy that required a reading of Bible verses
and recitation of the Lord's Prayer for non-objecting students); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidated program that called for teacher's to lead their
students in a daily, state-prescribed prayer).
48. Although the Supreme Court recognized religious freedom in
universities. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), and upheld the Equal
Access Act permitting religious clubs in high schools in Board of Education of
[Vo1:48576
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despite the handful of peripheral cases regarding legislative
prayer in the twenty-years after Marsh,49 no case that
questioned the specific religious content of legislative prayer
reached the federal appellate level until Wynne v. Town of
Great Falls in 2004.0 Initially, in Wynne, and most recently,
in Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, a number of
federal courts have failed to consistently apply Marsh. The
inconsistent application of Marsh has resulted from the
application of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Allegheny,
a case addressing religious symbols in the public square.
A. Wynne v. Town of Great Falls: The Unlikely Marriage of
Marsh and the "Coercion Test"5 For Analyzing Sectarian
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990), the Court
continued to be skeptical of prayer in public schools. See Sante Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (forbade student-led prayer at high school
football game); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (forbade clergyperson from
praying at public middle-school graduation ceremony); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985) (struck down mandatory moment of silence for meditation or
voluntary prayer). The post-Marsh years did yield some other progress for
advocates of religion in the public square, particularly in the line of equal access
cases, including Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001),
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384
(1993), and in the university funding cases, particularly Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
49. See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (prayer before meals
violated Establishment Clause because of unique coercive environment); Coles
v. Cleveland Bd. of Ed., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that a school
board's practice of opening its meetings with a moment of silence or prayer
violated the Establishment Clause); Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227
(finding that a city council did not violate the Establishment Clause when it
denied a citizen permission to recite his proposed prayer because the citizen was
proselytizing when he sought to convert the audience to his belief in the
sacrilegious nature of government prayer).
50. Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004). Wynne was
the first federal appellate decision to ignore the mandate of Marsh and make an
evaluation of the religious content of the speech. Here, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that "repeated sectarian references" spoken throughout a legislative
prayer establish religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Wynne, 376
F.3d at 301-02.
51. " Vhile the coercion test developed in the public-school prayer context,
the Fourth Circuit's extension into an adult-prayer scenario highlighted a
precedential gap between a body of law focused on minor children and a lone
Supreme Court case addressing adult prayer in a legislative situation."
Elizabeth B. Halligan, Comment, Coercing Adults?: The Fourth Circuit and the
Acceptability of Religious Expression in Government Settings, 57 S.C. L. REV.
923 (2006) (arguing that the Fourth Circuit may have pushed the boundaries of
its authority by applying a test developed for children to adults in Wynne and
Simpson).
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Legislative Prayer Cases
Wynne pioneered a series of Fourth Circuit cases that
attempted to define the scope of Marsh's holding.52 In Wynne,
a practitioner of Wicca sued the town council to enjoin it from
praying in the name of "Jesus Christ" at the conclusion of the
invocation.53 Earlier, Ms. Wynne had contacted the council
and informed them that she was uncomfortable with the
atmosphere and she even "proposed that the prayer's
references be limited to 'God' or, instead, 'that many members
of different religions be invited to give prayers."'54 Although
the council adopted a non-sectarian policy a few weeks prior
to trial,55 anecdotal commentary suggested that members of
the council expressed both official and unofficial animosity
towards Ms. Wynne. 6
The trial court permanently enjoined the council from
making any sectarian references at future meetings. 57 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit condemned the council's conduct
for failing to adhere to the mandate of Marsh that they not
engage in legislative prayer that proselytizes or disparages
other faiths." However, in condemning the council for not
52. See, e.g., Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d
276 (4th Cir. 2005); Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56786 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2006). Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit has
been particularly fertile ground for "government speech" litigation. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004); Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va. DMV, 288 F.3d 610 (4th Cir.
2002), reh'g denied, 305 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2002).
53. Wynne, 376 F.3d at 294.
54. Id. at 295.
55. Id. at 296 n.2 ("On June 23, 2003, a few weeks before the trial, the Town
Council adopted a resolution setting forth a policy governing prayers at Council
meetings. The resolution provided that '[t]he invocation shall not contain or
address any specific beliefs . . . of any specific religion.' But, after adoption of
the Resolution, Council Member Stevenson told Wynne that things 'would stay
the same'. . . and Mayor Starnes testified at trial that the Resolution 'would not
prohibit any Town Council member from making specific references to Christ,
Jesus Christ, or Christ in any prayer opening the Town Council meeting.'").
56. Id. at 295 ("Wynne continued to attend Town Council meetings, but she
testified 'it began to get hard.' When she refused to stand during the Christian
invocation, she heard a voice, which she believed was Councilman Broom's,
state, 'Well I guess some people aren't going to participate.' Her fellow citizens
then told Wynne she 'wasn't wanted,' and that she 'should leave town'; they
accused her of being a 'Satanist,' and threatened that she 'could possibly be
burned out."').
57. Id. at 296.
58. Id. at 301-02 ("Great Falls engaged, as part of public business and for
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adhering to Marsh, the court failed to articulate its
understanding of the framework of Marsh before determining
that an Establishment Clause violation had occurred.59 Thus,
the sweeping scope of the Wynne court's ruling only seems
appropriate when viewed as a remedial punishment for the
town's public denigration of a religious minority. Additionally,
the court's inquiry also failed to consider whether the same
standard should apply when the invocation at issue was not
consistently provided by the same speaker. 60  For example,
would an invited clergyperson still be subject to the same
prayer restrictions as a councilmember or school board
member?
B. Simpson v. Chesterfield County: The "Invocation" of the
"Government Speech" Doctrine Simultaneously Trumps Both
Marsh and the Free Speech Clause
A year later, this question arose in a similar case that
also concerned both Wiccans and the content of legislative
prayer within the Fourth Circuit. At issue in Simpson v.
Chesterfield County,61 was the Chesterfield County Board of
Supervisors's policy that allowed leaders of religious
congregations to give an invocation prior to meetings.62
Simpson, a Wiccan Priestess, wished to give an invocation
with other leaders at county meetings. The Board of
Supervisors rejected her request because its policy required
that each "invocation must be non-sectarian with elements of
the American civil religion .... "
In Simpson, Chief Judge Wilkinson remarked that the
decision in Wynne "found a Town Council's practice explicitly
advancing exclusively Christian themes to be
unconstitutional."65 Particularly, "Wynne was concerned that
the citizenry as a whole, in prayers that contain explicit references to a deity in
whose divinity only those of one faith believe. The invocations at issue here,
which specifically call upon Jesus Christ, are simply not constitutionally
acceptable legislative prayer like that approved in Marsh.").
59. See generally Wynne, 376 F.3d 292.
60. See generally id.
61. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th
Cir. 2005).
62. Id. at 278-79.
63. Id. at 279.
64. Id. at 278.
65. Id. at 282.
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repeated invocation of the tenets of a single faith undermined
our commitment to participation by persons of all faiths in
public life."66 Wilkinson attributed the Wynne court's decision
to the fact that the town was advancing "exclusively"
Christian themes that were offered by the same person.
Additionally, Chief Judge Wilkinson took note of the
"repeated" religious references made by the speakers.68
In his summary of Wynne, however, Chief Judge
Wilkinson spoke the loudest where he spoke the least. By
concluding almost summarily that the "government speech
doctrine" permitted the board to control the content of the
speech, Chief Judge Wilkinson avoided the need to address
the question of whether all invocations of a single faith rise to
the level of an Establishment Clause violation. However,
despite dismissing the Free Speech claim on "government
speech" grounds, he did acknowledge the "spacious
boundaries set forth in Marsh."69 Indeed, by emphasizing the
"repeated" sectarian references and generally hostile
atmosphere in Wynne,7" it seems unlikely Chief Judge
Wilkinson would conclude that isolated sectarian references
violate the Establishment Clause.
C. Hinrichs v. Bosma: A U.S. District Court Outside of the
Fourth Circuit Continues to Overstep Marsh's "Spacious
Boundaries"
Shortly after the Fourth Circuit's decision in Simpson,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana addressed the significant questions that lingered
after Simpson in Hinrichs v. Bosma.71 The issue presented
was whether isolated sectarian references, offered by a
multitude of faiths during the course of the year-long Indiana
House of Representatives legislative session, violated the
Establishment Clause.72
66. Id. at 283.
67. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 283 (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 284.
70. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 283-84.
71. Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005), stay denied,
440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom, Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Ind. Gen. Assembly, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25363 (7th
Cir. Oct. 30, 2007).
72. Id. at 1106 ("Transcripts are available for forty-five prayers. Of these,
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Unlike both the Wynne and Simpson cases, a non-
sectarian prayer policy did not exist in the Indiana House.
Hinrichs v. Bosma arose when Indiana State Speaker of the
House Brian Bosma refused to adopt a policy requiring that
only non-sectarian prayer be given at the beginning of
Indiana State House proceedings.73  Unlike the
aforementioned Fourth Circuit cases, in addition to arguing
free speech and free exercise claims,74 Bosma had an
additional weapon in his arsenal. Unlike Marsh or Wynne,
there were no allegations in Bosma that one speaker
continuously provided the invocation.75 Generally, Bosma is
distinguishable from the previously decided legislative prayer
cases because by inviting a broad variety of religious
denominations to present invocations, the legislature avoids
violating the Establishment Clause by institutionally
preferring one faith over another. The fifty-three prayers
offered during the 2005 session included prayers by a Jewish
rabbi and a Muslim imam. 6 Unfortunately, even the
inclusion of these additional facts was not enough to persuade
the District Court of "the Speaker's view, [that] Marsh v.
Chambers imposes no limits on legislative prayer, apart
perhaps from intentional discrimination in the selection of
volunteer clergy from different religious faiths.77
In later denying the stay on the permanent injunction,
Judge Hamilton followed Bosma's concession that the opening
prayer was "government speech"78 with the comment that
"[Bosma] has not attempted to create a public forum in which
all are welcome to express their faiths."79 This false dichotomy
is not wholly inclusive of the determinative factors. If, as
Hamilton claims, a prayer forum where "all are welcome to
twenty-nine were offered in the name of Jesus, Jesus Christ, the Savior, and/or
the Son. In the majority of these invocations, the officiant did not indicate that
he or she was personally praying in the name of Jesus or Christ. Some
officiants explicitly stated that the prayer was offered for all those assembled or
for persons other than the legislative body. The substantial majority of prayers
offered during the 2005 session were explicitly Christian in content.").
73. See id. at 1108-09.
74. See id. at 1115.
75. See id. at 1108-09.
76. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1129.
77. Id. at 1125.
78. Hinrichs v. Bosma, 410 F. Supp. 2d 745, 750 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
79. Id.
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express their faiths"80 would be permissible, the quantity of
speakers certainly does not change the fact that the speaking
opportunity is still provided by the government.8 1 Rather, the
appropriate questions to ask are: 1) whether the
constitutional concern arises because the opportunity is
birthed in the shroud of state authority; 2) whether the
constitutional concern arises from the lack of "prayer
diversity" when that opportunity is presented,8 2 and 3)
whether the venue and means make clear that any sectarian
prayer that may be offered is not endorsed by the state.
While connected, these issues are worth considering
separately. The ultimate question is which of these values
controls.
Bosma immediately appealed the District Court's refusal
to grant a stay on the injunction. 3 In a divided panel
opinion, the Seventh Circuit denied Bosma's request for a
stay on the injunction. 4 In dissent, Circuit Judge Kanne
candidly summed up the sentiments of both individuals who
wished to pray according to their conscience and their legal
advocates:
The only time the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of legislative prayer it approved of the
practice. A key dispute in this case, as it appears now, is
whether Marsh rests on a line drawn between sectarian
and nonsectarian legislative prayer. While there is case
80. Id.
81. Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005), stay denied,
440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom, Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Ind. Gen. Assembly, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25363 (7th
Cir. Oct. 30, 2007).
82. When courts focus only on the prayer and fail to focus on the prayer
opportunity, which is the relevant inquiry under Marsh, they leave the
constitutionality of any prayer at the mercy of the "prayer diversity"
attributable not simply to the community, but attributable to the members of
the community who take the initiative to provide prayers at legislative sessions.
This is exactly what happened in Doe where the court observed that "even if
another type of prayer had been given, which the Board failed to show, that
would not cure the unconstitutionality of the prayers . . . ." Doe v. Tangipahoa
Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188, 205 n.6 (5th Cir. 2006). By failing to focus on the
prayer opportunity, the court found four sectarian prayers unconstitutional-
not because someone had suffered a legitimate constitutional injury by being
denied the opportunity to pray-but simply because all the prayers were
Christian.
83. Bosma, 440 F.3d at 394.
84. Id. at 403.
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law supporting the proposition that Marsh approves of
only nonsectarian legislative prayer, there still remain
powerful arguments to the contrary, not the least of which
is the Marsh majority's curious ambiguity on the point.
Moreover, other factual differences may drive the ultimate
ruling in this case. The nuanced nature of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence in general and the recognized status
of legislative prayer as holding its own unique place in our
nation's history make it difficult, if not impossible, to say
that the Speaker lacks a significant probability of success
on the merits. The legal uncertainty caused by the special
place legislative prayer holds in our nation's heritage and
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the absence of
irreparable harm, and the deference due to another
sovereign's internal spiritual practices require that we
stay the district court's injunction at least until we can
determine for ourselves whether a constitutional violation
has occurred. 5
The Seventh Circuit's refusal to stay the injunction was
not met with much enthusiasm inside the Indiana House. In
February of 2007, "Rep. Mike Sodrel, R-Ind., responded by
introducing a bill that would remove the content of speech at
legislative sessions from judicial review. The bill was
referred to the House Judiciary Committee." 6
During the Bosma oral argument before the Seventh
Circuit on September 7, 2006, one judge asked Bosma's
attorney how he would respond to the adoption of a policy by
the Indiana House that would only permit Christian
invocations. This question brings to light the essence of the
debate over legislative prayer policies. Clearly, the
hypothetical policy proposed violates the Establishment
Clause under the current jurisprudence. The main concern
from a religious liberty perspective, however, may not be that
the Establishment Clause precedent dictates this result.
While individuals on both sides of the fence would be aghast
at the adoption of such a policy, the most egregious violation
85. Id. at 403 (Kanne, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
86. Adelle M. Banks, Should 'Jesus' Name' Be Scratched From Public
Prayers?, THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, Apr. 16, 2006,
http://pewforum.org/news/display.php?NewsID=10367.
87. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Hinrichs v. Bosma Oral Argument,
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov (follow "Oral Argument" hyperlink, enter case
number 05-4604; then follow "List Cases", then follow "05-4604" hyperlink, then
follow "Oral Argument" hyperlink).
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of the Establishment Clause here is where the policy
instructs individuals on how they must pray-that is what
the heart of the Establishment Clause prohibits. As such, it
is unclear how the principle behind the hypothetical policy is
any different from the "non-sectarian" prayer policy that
currently stands.
On October 30, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit released its opinion in Bosma. 8 The
Court in Bosma refused to address the constitutionality of the
sectarian prayers at issue and held that the plaintiffs-
taxpayers lacked the requisite standing to bring suit on the
basis of two recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions decided
while the case was pending. 9
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Wood recounts that
"[tihe Establishment Clause uniquely involves [a] sort of
psychic, aesthetic, or intangible injury."90 Yet, in support of
this proposition, she cited three cases that each concerned
religious symbols on public property-similar to the manner
that other federal courts have cited the religious symbols case
of Allegheny in tandem with Marsh when engaging in
sectarian legislative prayer analysis. 9' This trio of cases
failed to include any case law support for the proposition that
a "psychic, aesthetic, or intangible injury"92 may accrue and
be used to challenge the sectarian content of a defendant's
religious speech in the form of legislative prayer.
88. Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005), rev'd sub nom,
Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Ind. Gen. Assembly,
506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007).
89. See DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1864 (2006) ("We hold
that state taxpayers have no standing under Article III to challenge state tax or
spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as taxpayers."); Hein v.
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007) (holding that
federal taxpayers lack standing to bring Establishment Clause challenge unless
Congress had expressly authorized the expenditures for religious purposes).
90. Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Ind. Gen.
Assembly, 506 F.3d at 606 (Wood, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (citing McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (striking
down display of Ten Commandments on public property); Van Orden v. Perry,
545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (upholding display of Ten Commandments on public
property); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (upholding display of
creche on public property)).
92. Id.
93. Just as the First Amendment fails to rise to a "constitutional injury" in
the form of an Establishment Clause claim when an individual becomes
offended at a public display of religious symbols, the First Amendment fails to
[Vo1:48584
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Additionally, Judge Wood apparently failed to consider the
recent Fifth Circuit opinion that dismissed a plaintiffs suit
that had been filed in objection to a legislative body's
repeatedly sectarian legislative prayers on the grounds that
the plaintiff lacked sufficient standing-the legal trajectory
echoed by the majority's opinion in Bosma.94 Nevertheless, by
reversing the opinion of the district court and dissolving the
injunction it issued earlier, the question of the
constitutionality of sectarian legislative prayer currently
remains "an open one."95
III. "NON-SECTARIAN" PRAYER POLICIES VIOLATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
While the U.S. Supreme Court in Marsh ruled that
legislative prayers do not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment,96 it did not give government entities a
license to censor prayer at will. Thus, a judicial approach
that requires "non-sectarian prayer" is also flawed because it
promotes deism and establishes a civic religion-. In Lee v.
give rise to a "constitutional injury" in the form of an Establishment Clause
claim when a member of the audience becomes offended at the deity invoked by
a speaker during legislative prayer. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694
(2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The only injury to [petitioner Van Orden] is
that he takes offense to seeing the monument as he passes it on his way to the
Texas Supreme Court library.")
94. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2007) (en
banc) (holding that plaintiffs who wished to challenge sectarian legislative
invocations lacked standing to sue).
95. Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Ind. Gen.
Assembly, 506 F.3d at 604 (Wood, J., dissenting).
96. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793-94 (1983).
97. See generally Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of
Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083 (1996). In this article, Epstein
attempts to distinguish civic religion from ceremonial deism by suggesting that
"whether a particular ceremonial practice is an acceptable part of . . . civic
religion is not useful for determining whether that practice is consistent with
the Establishment Clause." Id. at 2098. Epstein contends that notwithstanding
the fact that ceremonial deism does not establish a civic religion, whether or not
ceremonial deism is constitutional is an open question nevertheless. This form
of inverse analysis is reminiscent of both Justice Brennan's dissent in Marsh,
463 U.S. at 794-95, (Brennan, J., dissenting), where he disagrees with the
majority's decision to uphold legislative prayer based on its unique historical
place in American society, not by virtue of withstanding scrutiny under an
Establishment Clause analysis, and Justice Brennan's concurrence in Schempp,
where he argues that "In God We Trust" does not violate the Establishment
Clause because "we have simply interwoven the motto so deeply into the fabric
of our civil polity that its present use may well not present that type of
586 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:48
Weisman, the U.S. Supreme Court observed, "It is a
cornerstone principle of our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence that 'it is no part of the business of government
to compose official prayers for any group of the American
people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by
government.' "98 The Court in Lee prudently recognized, "[a]
state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of
belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that
religious faith is real, not imposed."99
In Lee, the Court struck down a middle school prayer
policy, 100 much like the ones at issue in Bosma, Turner v. City
Council of Fredericksburg, and Klingenschmitt v. Winter,1°1
which directed all prayers to be non-sectarian. 102 The Court
pointed out that such a policy unconstitutionally "direct[s]
and control[s] the content of the prayers" in violation of the
Establishment Clause. The Court made clear that:
The central meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First
involvement which the First Amendment prohibits," Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). But see Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. at 696 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Telling either
nonbelievers or believers that the words 'under God' have no meaning
contradicts what they know to be true. Moreover, repetition does not deprive
religious words or symbols of their traditional meaning. Words like 'God' are not
vulgarities for which the shock value diminishes with each successive
utterance.")
98. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 425 (1962)).
99. Id. at 592.
100. Id. at 588.
101. Klingenschmitt v. Winter, No. 06-01832 (D.D.C. Oct. 2006), dismissed,
No. 07-5034 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2007). "The Navy favors the "non-sectarian" civic
religion over the Trinitarian Christian religion." Id. at 8. "The Navy promotes
Unitarianism over all other religions." Id. at 9. "The Navy permits its 'non-
sectarian' and Unitarian Chaplains to express themselves fully and does not
place limits on how they pray." Id. "The Navy places limits on how their
Christian Chaplains can publicly pray and forbids them from saying 'in Jesus'
name." Id. Although this case was recently dismissed on standing grounds, the
facts have a high likelihood of repetition so this controversy should still be
considered active. However, although we recognize the importance of
Klingenschmitt's Free Exercise and Free Speech rights, we also realize that Rev.
Klingenschmitt's case, even if decided on the merits, would have an additional
obstacle to overcome. Federal courts are highly "deferen[tial] . . . in the area of
military affairs." Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,
Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 58 (2006); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504
(1986) (Jewish Air Force officer forbidden from wearing yarmulke indoors).
Nevertheless, Rev. Klingenschmitt was fortunate to have been able to "invoke"
the protection of RFRA since the U.S. Navy was a federal defendant.
102. Lee, 505 U.S. at 598-99.
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Amendment . . . is that all creeds must be tolerated and
none favored. The suggestion that government may
establish an official or civic religion as a means of avoiding
the establishment of a religion with more specific creeds
strikes us as a contradiction that cannot be accepted."' °3
While the U.S. Supreme Court, in Lee, has said that the
government may not comprise an official prayer, it follows
that individually promulgated and expressed invocations
containing some sectarian references, including a deity, does
not "proselytize" or "disparage," in violation of Marsh, but is
simply a tolerable accommodation of the religious diversity in
this country.
IV. COURTS SHOULD CONTINUE Focus ON THE "PRAYER
OPPORTUNITY" AND NOT THE "CONTENT OF THE PRAYER"
WHEN ANALYZING LEGISLATIVE PRAYER CASES
After the District Court decision in Bosma, but before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit spoke
on the injunction, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia issued a decision in Pelphrey v.
Cobb County"°4 that took a significantly different approach for
evaluating sectarian references in legislative prayer. Only
three months later, after the district court's decision on the
merits in Pelphrey, a similar legislative prayer case was
decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. This decision was later reversed on different grounds
before the en banc panel. However, the decision of the initial
three-judge panel is noteworthy because Judge Clement, in
dissent, adopted a significant portion of the "practice-focused"
analysis first suggested by the Court in Pelphrey. This
approach contends that courts should evaluate cases that
arise out of sectarian legislative prayer controversies by
focusing their initial judicial inquiry on the facts that
culminate in the prayer opportunity, and not the content of
the speaker's prayer-unless the prayer clearly "proselytizes
or disparages." Only then may the Court, as acknowledged in
Marsh, "parse" the content of the sectarian prayer. This
approach should be followed because it provides the widest
latitude for toleration and accommodation of individual
103. Id. at 590.
104. Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 410 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
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expression, consistent with the Establishment Clause, and is
consistent with the language and analysis set forth by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Marsh.
A. Pelphrey v. Cobb County: A Step Away from an
Evaluation of the Sectarian Content of Prayer and a Step
Toward the "Practice Focused Analysis"
In Pelphrey, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia refused to grant a preliminary
injunction to citizens who brought suit against the county
planning commission for permitting isolated sectarian
references during legislative prayers. 1 5 This decision marked
the first time that a lower federal court explicitly
acknowledged that a sectarian reference did not inherently
offend the Establishment Clause. The decision was crucial
because this was the first decision to distance itself from the
content of the prayer and focus more on opportunity for
prayer-a trend that has attracted attention in subsequent
cases.
In Cobb County, taxpayers sued to enjoin invited
speakers who serve as "leaders at local religious institutions"
from making sectarian references. 10 6  Even though the
Board's clergy selection policy mirrored the policy in Simpson,
the court determined that not all sectarian verbiage must be
removed from invocations at the beginning of legislative
sessions so long as the mandate of Marsh to not exploit or
proselytize a particular faith is met.' 7 As such, "isolated
sectarian references without more [are] insufficient to find
prayer violated prohibitions of Marsh."108
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1325.
107. Id. at 1345-46 ("[TIhe Court does not believe the Supreme Court's
precedent in the arena of legislative prayer can be reduced to a requirement
that all sectarian verbiage be excised from invocations. Rather, what it
perceives as proscribed by the Supreme Court is an impermissible motive in the
selection of clergy to provide legislative invocations; an exploitation of the
allowance of an invocational opportunity by the legislature to promote the
beliefs of one religious sect, or to disparage those of any other; or the
maintenance of a practice that conveys the impression that the government has
purposely elected to prefer one religious view to the exclusion of those of other
faiths. The focus of each proscription, in all events, is not on a 'particular
prayer,' but on the invocational practice as a whole.").
108. Id. at 1334 n.10 (citing Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 265, 289 (D.C.
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The court's decision in Cobb County raises the question of
whether there is a substantive constitutional difference
between an elected government official invoking a sectarian
reference from a state-sponsored forum and an invited guest
speaker invoking a sectarian reference from a state-sponsored
forum.10 9 Because any attempt by a legislative body to coerce
council-members or invited guests to pray in particular ways
raises significant and substantial Establishment Clause
concerns, the court noted a novel and insightful approach to
legislative prayer analysis when it suggested that "the focus
of the court's inquiry should be on a legislature's practice,
rather than on a particular prayer, the selection and identity
of speakers should be analyzed separately from the content of
the prayer."11
B. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board: Judge Clement's
Dissent and the Continued Development of the "Practice
Focused Analysis"
A well-balanced framework for interpreting Marsh may
be found in Judge Clement's dissent in Doe v. Tangipahoa
Parish School Board,111 which recently expanded on the
standard of focusing "not on the content of the prayer but on
the practices and motivations behind the prayer
opportunity." '112 Although he case was later dismissed en
banc on standing grounds, the lawsuit has been refiled and
Judge Clement's views may be expected to be advanced once
again. However, even if they are not, her approach and
analysis is worthy of serious consideration.
In Doe, the Fifth Circuit considered a series of stipulated
prayers given at the invocation preceding Tangipahoa School
Board meetings."' Three of the four prayers in question
invoked the name of "Jesus" while one of the aforementioned
three prayers named "Jesus" twice." 4  The court applied
Cir. 2005)).
109. See generally Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga.
2006).
110. Id. at 1368 n.12.
111. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188, 212 (5th Cir. 2006)
(Clement, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 192-93 (majority opinion).
114. Id.
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Marsh instead of Lemon to strike down the stipulated prayers
as a violation of the Establishment Clause.115 The majority in
Doe claimed to have applied a "practice focus" analysis just as
the Pelphrey v. Cobb County court had done, because both the
Pelphrey and Doe courts went out of their way to say that it
was not the invocation of the sectarian references that caused
the prayers to be stricken-but the factual absence of other
non-Christian prayers during legislative sessions that caused
the Christian prayers at issue to tumble over the edge of the
Establishment Clause. 1
6
Judge Clement's dissent in Doe applies the approach first
articulated in Pelphrey v. Cobb County."' Initiating her
inquiry by recalling first principles, Judge Clement reminds
us that, as Cobb County suggested, "[t]he Marsh Court's focus
was-as ours should be-not on the content of the prayer but
on the practices and motivations behind the prayer
opportunity."' 8 She reminds the majority that the burden in
an Establishment Clause case is on the plaintiff to prove that
the speaking party is committing a constitutional violation. 9
Judge Clement contends that the "fact-intensive" practice
approach 20 suggested in Cobb County and by the majority
115. Id. at 191.
116. Id. at 204-05. The court in Pelphrey acknowledged that "the sectarian
references cited by Plaintiffs appear rather austere and innocuous when
measured against those found objectionable in cases such as Hinrichs and,
indeed, with respect to prayers offered before 1980 . . . ." Pelphrey v. Cobb
County, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (holding that the county
violated the Establishment Clause, not by permitting sectarian invocations in
legislative prayer, but when it failed to solicit clergy from a variety of faiths
within the county and clergy from a variety of faiths were reasonably solicitable
within the county). Additionally, the court in Doe acknowledged that "[iut is the
Board's stipulated prayer practice, not one particular prayer, that is at issue."
Doe, 473 F.3d at 203 n.2. Furthermore, as to eradicate any suggestion that this
opinion controls all future cases involving sectarian prayer within the circuit,
the court goes on to state that "this opinion does not 'render all sectarian prayer
necessarily unconstitutional.' Nor . . . does it 'reduc[e] Marsh to a
sectarian/non-sectarian litmus test.'" Id. at 205 n.6.
117. See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 410 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1344-45 (N.D. Ga.
2006).
118. Doe, 473 F.3d at 212 (Clement, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 215.
120. Cobb County, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1343-44. The court in Cobb County and
the majority opinion in Doe adopt a "fact-intensive practice approach" to
sectarian prayer analysis that is reminiscent of the path Justice Breyer adopted
in the Ten Commandments case of Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698-700
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). We argue that this approach yields excessive
power to federal judges and encourages the unnecessary involvement of federal
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opinion in Doe, shifts the burden to the defendant to justify
their conduct when, in fact, the defendant-speaker should not
be forced to bear any burden. 121 Judge Clement's "burden"'
122
analysis is also relevant to a speaker's Free Speech argument.
Under this approach, a constitutional concern never
arises from the content of the prayer, just as no constitutional
concern arises from the practice of legislative prayer. Instead,
the constitutional concern arises when another party is
denied an opportunity to offer his or her prayer-as was the
case in Wynne and Simpson. However, the facts here were
completely unlike Wynne and Simpson because "Doe has
made no showing that he or anyone was ever denied the
opportunity to have an invocation led by someone of a more
personally acceptable denomination (or non-denomination). 23
Therefore, "Ielven if... historically, the Board's prayers have
been uniformly Christian ... is true, there is simply no record
evidence that the Board advances Christianity to the
exclusion of another sect or creed." 24 Without evidence that a
legislative body excludes an individual from leading a prayer,
no constitutional violation can be said to have occurred. 125
courts in affairs that should be resolved locally. Under the aforementioned
analyses, an Establishment Clause violation could arise when the population of
a town simply can not produce members of minority faith's who wish to pray at
legislative sessions. This quantity-intensive approach is flawed because it fails
to articulate a judiciably manageable standard for appropriate legislative
prayer and because a legislative body could approach an Establishment Clause
violation on the basis of coercion simply because no minority faiths wish to send
their clergy to pray. We do not believe that this scenario should give rise to an
Establishment Clause violation.
121. Doe, 473 F.3d at 215 (Clement, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at 212.
123. Id. at 215.
124. Id.
125. This theory, which has come to be known as "non-preferentialism," was
advocated by former Chief Justice Rehnquist and suggests that government
may favor religion over non-religion, but government may not favor certain
religions over others. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Non-preferentialism was most recently advocated at
length by Justice Scalia in Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
('[Tihere is nothing unconstitutional in a State's favoring religion generally...
.") and in McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 885-903 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing examples of religion in the public square throughout U.S.
history). But see Thomas B. Colby, "A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions?
Justice Scalia, The Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment
Clause," 100 Nw. U.L. REV 1097 (2006) (tracing the development of "non-
preferentialism" as an approach to Establishment Clause analysis but
ultimately disagreeing with the merits of the theory). "Non-preferentialism"
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Thus, under Judge Clement's analysis, 126 the plaintiff in
Wynne would only succeed in an Establishment Clause claim
against the Board if she were denied a prayer opportunity.
Following this logic, no speaker will ever face a constitutional
reprimand for praying as his or her conscience dictates. If the
member of a religious minority is denied the opportunity to
offer an invocation, liability will not fall on an individual, but
on the legislative body as a whole.
This approach provides the solution because it
recognizes that sectarian religious speech that does not
"proselytize or disparage" is permissible under Marsh. Yet, it
also takes into consideration the fears of individuals who
worry that legislative prayer opportunities can turn into
spiritual revival sessions. By focusing on the practice of the
prayer opportunity, and not the content of the prayer, unless
the prayer "proselytizes or disparages," courts can act
consistently with the precedent in Marsh and the First
Amendment religious liberty interests of those permitted to
open deliberative sessions with prayer.
Although the Doe opinion was ultimately vacated en
banc, 127 and while Cobb County has yet to reach the Eleventh
suggests that government may favor religion over non-religion, but government
may not favor certain religions over others. See generally Rob Natelson, 10
Commandments, "Under God," OK by Founders, THE BILLINGS OUTPOST, Apr.
28, 2005,
http://www.newbillingsoutpost.com/news/index.php?option=comcontent&task=
view&id=16137&Itemid=5 (agreeing that the government is precluded from
asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect over others but not
necessarily implying that the government may not favor religion over non-
religion). As an original matter, the implementation of legislative prayer at the
Founding implies that the many of the Framers were non-preferentialists. Prof.
Natelson's comprehensive study of the Establishment Clause concludes that the
Constitution's religion clauses were designed to further non-preferentialism; as
such, the government could support belief in God, so long as government did not
play favorites among religions. See Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning
of the Establishment Clause, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 73, 112 (2005). It
may be argued that the "non-preferential" approach has resulted in the "deist"
approach some courts have taken to legislative prayer cases thus far. We would
reject that approach for the reasons articulated in this paper. By enacting
legislative prayer in the first place and by affirming that the practice satisfies
constitutional muster, both the government and the U.S. Supreme Court have
already recognized that religion holds a special place in this society. Therefore,
these same bodies should not forbid a duly selected speaker from praying
according to his or her conscience simply because the entire body and/or
audience may not endorse the speaker's particular religious views.
126. Doe, 473 F.3d at 212 (Clement, J., dissenting).
127. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 2007) (en
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Circuit Court of Appeals, if either opinion were controlling,
under Judge Clement's analysis, neither case would prohibit
an isolated sectarian reference like the speech held
impermissible by the District Courts in Bosma or Turner
because the nature of the prayer opportunity permitted-and
resulted in-prayer from a variety of religious traditions.
V. COURTS MUST LIMIT THE "GOVERNMENT SPEECH"
DOCTRINE BECAUSE IT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH A "PRACTICE
FOCUS" ANALYSIS
Unfortunately, the fact that no lower court has adopted
the aforementioned theory for approaching sectarian
legislative prayer cases reveals the symptoms of a much
greater illness. The elephant in the room of these
manifestations of judicial confusion is known as the
"government speech" doctrine.128
banc).
128. See John E. Nowak, Using the Press Clause to Limit Government Speech,
30 ARIZ. L. REV 1, 8 (1988) ("Prior to 1977, there was very little scholarly
examination of the problem of government speech."); see also id. at n.1 (citing
Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863 (1979); Steven
Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980); Edward H. Ziegler,
Jr., Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official
Partisanship, 21 B. C. L. REV. 578 (1980)). Shortly thereafter, Professor
Douglas Laycock drafted an article where he extended Professor Ziegler's
contention that government must remain neutral on issues of public concern
into the realm of government religious speech. Naturally, Laycock took this
opportunity to comment on his disagreement with the relationship between
government and religion expressed by Justice Rehnquist, a year prior to the
publication of his article, in Jaffree:
With respect to government speech, my understanding of neutrality is
as rigorous as that of the most orthodox secularist. In my view, the
establishment clause absolutely disables the government from taking a
position for or against religion. The government must treat every
religious view with equal respect. "Agnostic" is the label that comes
closest to describing the attitude required of the government, but that
label is also misleading in an important way. An agnostic has no
opinion on whether God exists, and neither should the government. But
an agnostic also believes that humans are incapable of knowing
whether God exists. If the government believed that, it would prefer
agnostics over theists and atheists. Agnostics have no opinion for
epistemological reasons; the government must have no opinion for
constitutional reasons. The government must have no opinion because
it is not the government's role to have an opinion.
Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Status of Religious
Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1986). Laycock appeared
to hold the crystal ball and his article proved to be influential on at least one
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While the "government speech" doctrine is a relatively
new phenomenon in constitutional jurisprudence, in the
context of sectarian legislative prayer analysis, the doctrine
has been said to stand for the proposition that when actors
and events are cloaked with government authority, the
speech reflects the views of the government and therefore the
government can generally control the content of the speech. 129
A. Turner v. City of Fredericksburg: the "Government
Speech" Doctrine Revisited
Turner involved the adoption of a non-sectarian prayer
policy by the Fredericksburg, Virginia city council.' 30
However, unlike the city councils in Simpson and Cobb
County, which invited religious leaders from the
community,1'3 Fredericksburg's policy permitted members of
Supreme Court member. Within three years of the publication of Laycock's
article, that the phrase "government speech" made its first appearance into a
U.S. Supreme Court opinion. In his partial dissent in Allegheny, Justice
Kennedy explained his dissatisfaction with the Court's discussion and
treatment of religious symbols on government property. "I doubt not, for
example, that the Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a
large Latin cross on the roof of city hall. This is not because government speech
about religion is per se suspect, as the majority would have it, but because such
an obtrusive year-round religious display would place the government's weight
behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion." County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). "Passersby who disagree with the
message conveyed by [religious symbols on government property] are free to
ignore them, or even to turn their backs, just as they are free to do when they
disagree with any other form of government speech." Id. at 664. We think that
it is worth noting that both County of Allegheny and Board of Education v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) only dealt with "government speech" in the
context of religious symbols on government property. Needless to say, religious
symbols on government property are not legislative prayers.
129. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 288
(4th Cir. 2005) ("The context, and to a degree, the content of the invocation
segment is governed by established guidelines by which the Board may regulate
the content of what is or is not expressed when it 'enlists private entities to
convey its own message.'" (citing Simpson, 292 F.Supp.2d at 819 (internal
citations omitted) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))).
130. See generally Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56786, at *2-4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14 2006).
131. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 279; Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 410 F. Supp. 2d
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the council to sign up and deliver the invocation on a rotating
basis.'32 From the year of his initial election in 2002, until
the council's decision to adopt a nonsectarian prayer policy
pursuant to the ACLU's demand letter in 2005, elected
Councilman Rev. Hashmel Turner, Jr. ended his prayers with
"in Jesus' name. 133 Because of the rotating nature of the
prayer roster, Turner drew arguments from Marsh and Lee to
the effect that government should not be parsing prayers and
when it does, it risks establishing a civic religion.
1 3 1
Additionally, Turner recalled the language from Cobb County
that "isolated sectarian references, without more, [are]
insufficient to find prayer violated prohibitions of Marsh.''
Nevertheless, without even attempting to distinguish the
speaker from the content of the speech, or note that Cobb
County involved invited clergy, whereas Turner was an actual
member of the board, the District Court concluded that
"Councilor Turner's opening prayer is government speech,
and thus, the First Amendment guarantees are not
implicated." 36
1324, 1325-26 (2006).
132. Turner, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56786, at *2.
133. Id. at *2-3. For a time, Reverend Turner stopped praying to evaluate the
ACLU's challenge, but felt, in good conscience, that he had to start up again.
134. The argument in Lee stated:
It is a cornerstone principle of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence
that it is no part of the business of government to compose official
prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a
religious program carried on by government and that is what the school
officials attempted to do. Petitioners argue . . . that the directions for
the content of the prayers were a good-faith attempt by the school to
ensure that the sectarianism which is so often the flashpoint for
religious animosity be removed from the graduation ceremony ....
But though the First Amendment does not allow the government to
stifle prayers which aspire to these ends, neither does it permit the
government to undertake that task for itself . . . . And these same
precedents caution us to measure the idea of a civic religion .... The
suggestion that government may establish an official or civic religion as
a means of avoiding the establishment of a religion with more specific
creeds strikes us as a contradiction that cannot be accepted.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588-90 (1992) (citation omitted)
(quotations omitted).
135. Cobb County, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1334 n.10 (citing Newdow v. Bush, 355
F. Supp. 2d 265, 289 (D.D.C. 2005)).
136. Turner, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56786, at *9.
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B. The "Government Speech" Doctrine Poses a Significant
Danger to Religious Speech that is Protected Under the Fiirst
Amendment
Despite Chief Judge Wilkinson's recognition in Simpson
that neither Marsh nor Allegheny held that the identity of the
speaker "would 'affiliate the government with any one specific
faith or belief,' 137 both the Circuit Court in Simpson, and the
District Court in Turner, nevertheless concluded that
whenever sectarian religious speech was being directed from
a government podium it constituted "government speech"-
regardless of whether the words were spoken by an invited
guest or a board member.138  While Turner's attorneys
properly contested the argument that Rev. Turner's speech
was "government speech," the direction of the District Court's
decision in Bosma may be traced to Representative Bosma's
ill-advised stipulation that official prayers are government
speech.139 The issue, however, is more nuanced than the
question of whether Bosma's sectarian reference is
government speech. While the government provided the
prayer opportunity, 140 the prayer itself was, is, and, unless
expressly endorsed, always should be viewed as private
speech protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech
Clauses.' It is a cardinal principle that "there is a crucial
difference between government speech endorsing religion,
which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses protect.1 42
Therefore, because of the sweeping scope of the
"government speech" doctrine and the threat that it raises to
Free Speech concerns across the board, this doctrine must be
reconsidered or else other manifestations of speech, including
but not limited to religious speech, are likely to become
137. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 286.
138. See id. at 276; Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56786, at *9.
139. See 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1129 (S.D. Ind. 2005), stay denied, 440 F.3d
393 (7th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007).
140. See id. at 1104-08.
141. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
142. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality) (emphasis
added).
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strangers to the public square.
VI. "PROSELYTIZING" OR "DISPARAGING" REMARKS MADE IN
REGARDS TO THE TENETS OF OTHER FAITHS DURING
LEGISLATIVE PRAYER FIND No SHELTER IN THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
The numerous legal theories in judicial opinions across
the country have caused confusion within communities and
deliberative bodies that wish to avoid threats and costly
lawsuits but also wish to continue solemnizing their
meetings. Courts must reach a consensus on the proper
analysis to provide citizens and government officials some
predictability in the law on this issue. But as the previous
discussion of relevant cases reveals, federal courts have failed
to follow the path laid forth by the Supreme Court.
Fortunately, the horizon reveals that when Marsh is coupled
with a solid and basic understanding of the history of First
Amendment jurisprudence, a remarkably principled, clear,
and pragmatic approach emerges.
A. Marsh Plainly States that the Content of Speech May Not
be Examined by Court's Unless the Prayer Opportunity in
Question First "Proselytizes or Disparages..."
Indeed, the basic principle at the heart of Marsh correctly
identifies the proper relationship between deliberative bodies,
religion, and citizens, with speech and religious liberties.143
That basic principle, in the Court's words, is:
The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges,
where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer
opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance
any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief. That
being so, it is not for us to embark on a sensitive
evaluation or to parse the content of a particular prayer.144
Ironically, as content-based concerns continue to occupy
much of the debate among judges and lawyers regarding what
may be said throughout the course of a legislative prayer, a
proper application of the aforementioned standard is the key
to a remarkably consistent jurisprudence fully respectful of
the free speech rights of the person delivering the prayer and
143. See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
144. Id. at 794-95.
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establishment limits on the government meant to ensure that
political participants do not feel left out of the political
process as a result of legislative prayers. Careful scrutiny of
the existing case law shows that the content-based approach
is a shallow and misguided application of the standard
enunciated in Marsh.
A plain reading of Marsh illuminates a three-tier
analysis. 145  First, Marsh properly established legislative
prayer as a constitutionally tolerable expression of faith.14
Second, the Court in Marsh properly recognized that, with
rare exception, courts should not be in the business of parsing
prayers. 147  Under the third tier of analysis, the Court
reasoned that when the legislative prayer opportunity is
being used to proselytize or disparage, only then may a
federal court "embark on a sensitive evaluation or ... parse
the content of a particular prayer."
148
It is due to the failure of federal courts to consider each of
these steps that has caused courts to stray into a number of
different jurisprudential directions. The common tendency
has been for courts to consider Marsh's first tier and then
skip directly to tier three. 149 However, this is not an accurate
application of the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in
Marsh. It seems plausible that courts have avoided inquiring
into the proselytization prong of the test due to the fact that
the U.S. Supreme Court has "never defined the term
'proselytize,' much less provide[] any workable legal test for
145. See id. at 790-95.
146. Id. at 795 ("The Court today . . . holds that officially sponsored
legislative prayer . . . is generally exempted from the First Amendment's
prohibition against 'an establishment of religion."') (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. For example, in Wynne, the Court concluded that the routine use of
sectarian references in the legislative prayers of the Town Council violated the
Establishment Clause. Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298-99
(4th Cir. 2004). Although the Court did go through the effort of defining the
terms "proselytize" and "advance," and even went to such lengths as to
distinguish the two terms, the Court ultimately failed to critically consider
whether the use of sectarian references during legislative prayer inherently
"proselytize[s] or advance [s]" any one, or "disparage [s] any other, faith or belief,"
as described in the Marsh framework. Id. at 300 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 30, 1821 (3d ed. 1993)). Here, the Court failed to
see that merely referencing a specific deity does not necessarily "forward,
further, [or] promote" any particular religion, but in fact may serve only as a
tolerable acknowledgment of religion. Id.
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determining precisely what qualifies as prohibited
proselytizing."'0 As such, it comes as little surprise that to
date, many courts have considered the sectarian language of
the prayer, but very few courts have applied Marsh in a way
that focuses on whether the prayer "proselytize [s] and
disparage [s]. ' 151
B. Snyder v. Murray City Corp.: The Tenth Circuit Conducts
a Proper Application of the Marsh Framework
One such case that has considered the latter standard is
Snyder v. Murray City Corp.5 2 In Snyder, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals analyzed whether a legislative body violates
the Establishment Clause when it forbids an individual from
delivering a prayer that would mock the practice of legislative
prayer. 5 3 The court concluded that the city's refusal to offer
150. Christian M. Keiner, Preaching from the State's Prodium: What Speech
is Proselytizing Prohibited by the Establishment Clause?, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 83,
85 (2007).
151. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95.
152. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
153. The proposed prayer at issue stated:
OUR MOTHER, who art in heaven (if, indeed there is a heaven
and if there is a god that takes a woman's form) hallowed be thy
name, we ask for thy blessing for and guidance of those that will
participate in this meeting and for those mortals that govern the
state of Utah;
We fervently ask that you guide the leaders of this city, Salt
Lake County and the state of Utah so that they may see the wisdom
of separating church and state and so that they will never again
perform demeaning religious ceremonies as part of official
government functions;
We pray that you prevent self-righteous politicians from mis-
using the name of God in conducting government meetings; and,
that you lead them away from the hypocritical and blasphemous
deception of the public, attempting to make the people believe that
bureaucrats' decisions and actions have thy stamp of approval if
prayers are offered at the beginning of government meetings;
We ask that you grant Utah's leaders and politicians enough
courage and discernment to understand that religion is a private
matter between every individual and his or her deity; we beseech
thee to educate government leaders that religious beliefs should not
be broadcast and revealed for the purpose of impressing others; we
pray that you strike down those that mis-use your name and those
that cheapen the institution of prayer by using it for their own
selfish political gains;
We ask that the people of the state of Utah will some day learn
the wisdom of the separation of church and state; we ask that you
will teach the people of Utah that government should not
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Snyder an invitation to present his prayer was not a violation
of the Establishment Clause under Marsh.5 The court drew
this conclusion because Snyder's prayer was "proselytizing"'55
and "disparaging."156 Unlike the Wynne and Turner Courts,
which simply asserted that sectarian invocations ran afoul of
the principles of Marsh, the court in Snyder actually
evaluated the definitions of the words "proselytizing" and
"disparaging" in the context of Marsh.'
The court did not arrive at their conclusion in Snyder
because the plaintiff invoked the names of specific deities.
On the contrary, the "Establishment Clause does not prohibit
all prayer that can be identified with a particular sect."'5 8
"Rather, what is prohibited by the clause is a more aggressive
form of advancement, i.e., proselytization." 59 In reaching a
proper understanding of the Supreme Court's declaration in
Marsh, the Tenth Circuit noted, "the kind of legislative
prayer that will run afoul of the Constitution is one that
proselytizes a particular religious tenet or belief, or that
aggressively advocates a specific religious creed, or that
derogates another religious faith or doctrine."'60 Here, the
court used the term "proselytize," in context to demonstrate
participate in religion; we pray that you smite those government
officials that would attempt to censor or control prayers made by
anyone to you or to any other of our gods;
We ask that you deliver us from the evil of forced religious
worship now sought to be imposed upon the people of the state of
Utah by the actions of mis-guided, weak and stupid politicians, who
abuse power in their own self-righteousness;
All of this we ask in thy name and in the name of thy son (if in
fact you had a son that visited Earth) for the eternal betterment of
all of us who populate the great state of Utah.
Amen.
Id. at 1229 n.3.
154. Id. at 1234.
155. Id. at 1235 ("Because Snyder's prayer seeks to convert his audience to
his belief in the sacrilegious nature of governmental prayer, his prayer is itself
proselytizing.").
156. Id. at 1236 ("Snyder's proselytizing and disparaging prayer falls well
outside the scope of invocational legislative prayers found to be constitutional in
Marsh, and thus there was nothing improper about excluding it from the time
properly set aside for legislative prayer.").
157. See id. at 1232-34.
158. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188, 213 (5th Cir. 2006)
(Clement, J., dissenting) (citing Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1234 n.10).
159. Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1234 n.10 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
793 n.14, 794-95 (1983)).
160. Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1234.
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that danger in this scenario may only arise when the
government attempts "to convert citizens to particular
sectarian views.1 61
Under this application, the government would only be
permitted to prohibit prayers that place the government in a
position of effectively converting citizens to a particular
religion. 162  Applying this analysis to the facts, the Snyder
court concluded that the government had properly denied an
invitation to give the invocation because the proposed prayer
would proselytize and disparage. 163  The proposed prayer
disparaged other faiths because it referred to politicians who
believe in the use of legislative prayer as "'self-righteous,'
'hypocritical,' 'selfish,' 'mis-guided, weak, and stupid[.]" 164
Moreover, Snyder's prayer "proselytized" by asking for "the
wisdom of separating church and state" and to "never again
perform demeaning religious ceremonies as part of official
government functions.' 165 It is of particular importance to
note that while the Court listed several aspects of Snyder's
that constituted "proselytizing," the Court did find Snyder's
use of a deity at the end of his prayer to be constitutionally
prohibited. 166
The distinction to be made between Snyder and Turner is
as follows: While Snyder's prayer crossed the line, legislative
prayers that merely invoke the name of a deity such as
"Jesus" do not. A thin, but clear, line exists between the
invocation of a single sectarian reference and orthodoxy or
coercion. Snyder abused the prayer opportunity by
attempting to force his view that deliberative bodies should
endorse a "strict separation of church and state" onto
others.1 67  By simply mentioning a deity, whom clearly and
161. Id. at 1234 n.10 (emphasis added) (defining "proselytize" as "to convert
from one religion, belief, opinion, or party to another") (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) 1826 (1986)).
162. Marsh's refusal to examine prayer content was conditioned on there
being "no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to
proselytize or advance any one [faith or belief]." Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794. This
condition often requires the examination of content. Doe, 473 F.3d at 203 n.3.
163. Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1242.
164. Id. at 1235. However, the court did not raise concerns regarding the
following: "All of this we ask in thy name and in the name of thy son...." Id.
at 1228 n.3.
165. Id. at 1229 n.3.
166. Id, at 1235.
167. See id. at 1235 ("Because Snyder's prayer seeks to convert his audience
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reasonably relates to the person delivering the prayer, the
government in no way attempts to "convert" a listener's
religious beliefs. To the contrary, it is merely a tolerable
acknowledgment of that person's religious beliefs. As the
Snyder court observed, "all prayers 'advance' a particular
faith or belief in one way or another."16 This observation
"underscores the conclusion that the mere fact a prayer
evokes a particular concept of God is not enough to run afoul
of the Establishment Clause."169
VII.OUR CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BENEFITS FROM
EXPOSURE TO A VARIETY OF RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC
SQUARE
Under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Marsh, three
propositions of law are irrefutably clear: courts must
recognize: 1) the practice of legislative prayer is
constitutional; 2) it is not the business of courts to embark on
a sensitive evaluation of any legislative prayer at issue,
unless; 3) it is shown that the prayer opportunity is used to
proselytize or disparage another faith. Yet, in the 25 years
since Marsh concluded that the practice of legislative prayer
does not offend the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, many lower courts have struggled to analyze
Marsh correctly. A number of lower courts have mistakenly
understood the Court's holding in Marsh to stand for the
proposition that legislative prayers must omit sectarian
references to be safe from Establishment concerns. Ironically,
by attempting to avoid Establishment concerns, these
approaches have placed governments in the position of
reviewing and editing such prayers, which has resulted in
excessive entanglement between the government and
religion. Consequently, these approaches have stifled the
Free Speech rights of those persons permitted to deliver
prayers. As the U.S. Supreme Court declared some years
before Marsh, "[iit is a cornerstone principle of our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence that 'it is no part of the
to his belief in the sacrilegious nature of governmental prayer, his prayer is
itself proselytizing.").
168. Id. at 1234 n.10.
169. Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1234 n.10.
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business of government to compose official prayers for any
group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious
program carried on by government.' 170 While the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Lee, has said that the government may not
comprise an official prayer, lower courts must breathe life
into this statement by recognizing that the invocation of some
sectarian references, including a deity, does not "proselytize"
or "disparage," in violation of Marsh. The correct approach,
which focuses judicial inquiry on the facts that culminate in
the prayer opportunity, and not the content of the speaker's
prayer, is consistent with the language and analysis set forth
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Marsh. Until this "practice-
focused" approach is uniformly adopted, confusion will
continue to abound within the federal circuits concerning
what may be said, and who may be referenced, throughout
the duration of a legislative prayer.
While courts should consider this "practice-focused"
approach in the future, much may still be learned through
reflection on the past. Over forty years ago, in one of the most
controversial Religion Clause cases that ever addressed
Establishment concerns, Justice Goldberg wrote that: "[Ilt is
of course true that great consequences can grow from small
beginnings, but the measure of constitutional adjudication is
the ability and willingness to distinguish between real threat
and mere shadow."' 1  Taken by itself, Justice Goldberg's
comment seems incomplete without considering the context of
the adjudication at issue. Perhaps some context can be added
by considering the sage words of the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who reminds us that: "At this point in the
twentieth century we are quite far removed from the dangers
that prompted the Framers to include the Establishment
Clause in the Bill of Rights."17 2
When considered together, these quotes recognize that
there is both risk and justification for permitting individuals
to invoke sectarian language in their legislative prayers. As
170. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 425 (1962)).
171. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963)
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
172. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1983) (quoting Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970))).
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the late Justice Goldberg indicates, the real risk at stake by
permitting sectarian prayer is ultimately no more than "mere
shadow."173 As such, legislative bodies must take a stand to
preserve the free speech rights of those they have permitted
to speak and offer prayer. In doing so, these bodies must
pursue an environment that is neutral to each religion;
however, they may not create an environment that is hostile
toward any specific religion. To satisfy this aim, any policy a
board or council adopts must sincerely affirm the right of all
individuals in the community to choose their own words of
faith freely when presented the opportunity to pray. A
pluralistic nation like the United States must account for and
recognize that not everyone who prays does so in the same
way or to the same deity and "openness to ... ecumenism is
consonant with our character both as a nation of faith and as
a country of free religious exercise and broad religious
tolerance."174 Thus, by asserting the fundamental right to
pray according to one's conscience, whether at home or in
front of a council, courts promote religious liberty and pay
homage to the religious pluralism that is as much a part of
America's past and present as the practice of legislative
prayer itself.
173. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 308 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
174. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 284
(4th Cir. 2005).
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